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This master’s thesis aims to study the empirical relationship between taxation and innovation 
in Europe. To analyse this relationship, we propose the following research question: How do 
corporate income tax rates impact the number of patent applications in Europe?  
In order to investigate this research question, we construct a unique panel dataset from OECD 
patent and taxation data. The panel includes observations from 26 European OECD countries 
in the time period 1981 to 2017. The study is based on a quantitative analysis with a deductive 
and explanatory research approach. We develop an econometric model using fixed effects 
estimation which we use to analyse a two-sided hypothesis.  
The analyses suggest that an increase in corporate taxation has historically led to decreased 
innovation. We do not find statistically sufficient evidence to conclude this effect for the two 
time periods 1981 to 1989 and 1990 to 1999, but we find a significant effect in the time period 
of 2000 to 2010.  
Contradictorily to the existing literature, we also find evidence that suggests that the historical 
effect that is observed until 2010 flips in the time period from 2010 to 2017. We discuss 
whether this change might be a sign of a turning trend in the impact of corporate taxation on 
innovation in Europe. Because multiple European countries recently have introduced special 
tax policies, we argue that the introduction of patent boxes might be an explanation.  
These findings are an exciting turn of events. However, further research is necessary to fully 
conclude or disprove the latter finding of a regime change in corporate taxation of innovation.  
Our results contribute to the existing literature by studying the impact of corporate taxation on 
innovation in a larger sample of European OECD countries and over a longer time frame than 
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“On the one hand, taxation is an essential attribute of commercial society [...] on the other 
hand, it is almost inevitably [...] an injury to the productive process” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 
198). 
1.1 Background 
Economies are complex systems developed from the actions and activities of many 
participants. This complexity makes it difficult, but also fascinating to understand the 
determinants of economic growth. While there are many determinants of economic growth, 
innovation is amongst the most prominent.  
Innovation contributes to increased productivity that triggers positive effects on economic 
growth (European Central Bank, 2017). Taxes are typically designed for redistribution of 
wealth and gathering of public revenues, but not necessary with innovation in mind. Yet taxes 
reduce the expected net returns to innovation inputs and can lead to less innovation as an 
unwanted by-product (Akcigit & Stantcheva, 2020). It is apparent why policymakers must 
understand how taxation policies impact innovation. 
While taxation is essential for the modern welfare state, economists debate whether taxation 
impacts innovation and whether lower taxation can stimulate innovation and hence economic 
growth. If lower taxes do not stimulate innovation, reduced taxation can distort government 
budget balances and increase inequality across Europe.  
Furthermore, many European countries have made changes to their corporate taxation policies 
throughout the last decades. Countries such as Denmark, Great Britain, and France have all 
adjusted their corporate taxation rates, but we currently know little about how the tax changes 
have impacted innovation. In this study, we contribute to this debate by analysing how 




In a recent research article, Akcigit, Grigsby, Nicholas and Stantcheva (2018) study innovation 
in the U.S. by exploiting patent data to show that increased corporate income tax rates reduce 
the number of patent applications. The purpose of this master thesis is to study whether a 
similar relationship between innovation and corporate taxation exists in Europe. In other 
words, we analyse whether corporate taxation impacts the number of patent applications in 
Europe.  
In order to achieve this purpose, this thesis specifically aims to answer the following research 
question:  
How do corporate income tax rates impact the number of patent applications in Europe? 
The study is based on a quantitative analysis with a deductive research approach. This means 
that we develop an econometric model based on fixed effects and draw up a two-sided 
hypothesis. The objective is to analyse whether we can reject the null hypothesis. 
We exploit the universe of patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) and 
country-specific corporate tax rates in Europe. Patent data is retrieved from the OECD 
REGPAT database while taxation data is retrieved from the OECD tax database. We create a 
unique panel dataset of number of patent applications and corporate income tax rates across 
26 European OECD countries in the time period between 1981 to 2017. 
This study builds upon the existing literature on the empirical relationship between innovation 
and corporate taxation. Amongst European studies, Ernst and Spengel (2011) and Karkinsky 
and Riedel (2009) find negative impacts of corporate taxation on the number of patent 
applications in Europe. We contribute to this literature by studying this impact in a larger 
sample of European OECD countries over a longer time frame. 
The outcome is particularly relevant for policy makers since we argue that innovation is an 
important driver of economic growth. If higher corporate tax rates indeed reduce innovation, 




This study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of existing literature 
on the empirical relationship between innovation and taxation. Here, we highlight several 
research papers that have studied similar topics. Chapter 3 describes the methodology. Here, 
we develop the econometric model and hypothesis. Chapter 4 provides descriptive statistics 
which are helpful in understanding the structure of the underlying data. This chapter also 
presents and discusses the regression analyses. Chapter 5 discusses the results, limitations of 
the study and topics for further research. Chapter 6 presents a conclusion in the form of an 




This chapter provides overview of literature on the relationship between innovation and 
taxation. First, we discuss innovation and the role of patents. Next, we discuss corporate 
taxation. Last, we review existing literature on the empirical relationship between innovation 
and taxation.  
2.1 Innovation 
The European Central Bank (2017) describes why innovation is essential to the economy: 
“Simply put, innovation can lead to higher productivity, meaning that the same input generates 
a greater output. As productivity rises, more goods and services are produced – in other words, 
the economy grows”.  
The impact of innovation on economic growth has been discussed by many great economists. 
In the paper Endogenous Technological Change, Romer (1990) states that technological 
change lies at the heart of economic growth. Romer builds on the neoclassical model 
introduced by Solow (1956), adding technological change to create an endogenous explanation 
of economic growth.  
The impact of innovation on economic growth has also been empirically documented, for 
example in The Rise of American Ingenuity: Innovation and Inventors of the Golden Age by 
Akcigit, Grigsby and Nicholas (2017). In this paper, the researchers conclude that states in the 
U.S. with the most innovations witnessed the fastest growth between 1900 and 2000.  
Given that the relationship between innovation and economic growth is well-established, we 
move on to study the concept of innovation.  
A fascinating perspective on innovation originates from the economist Joseph Schumpeter. In 
his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942), Schumpeter introduces the expression 
Creative Destruction. He explains: 
“The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes 
from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the 
new markets, .... [This process] incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from 
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process 
of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.” (p. 83). 
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Schumpeter (1942) describes how innovation can be a developing and revolutionising process 
which drives the economy forward. Creative destruction establishes the foundation for how 
we understand innovation today. However, there are numerous definitions of innovation.  
In a research paper, Baregheh, Rowley and Sambrook (2009) find approximately 60 various 
definitions of innovation. As a result of their findings, the authors recommended the following 
definition: “Innovation is the multi-stage process whereby organizations transform ideas into 
new or improved products, service or processes, in order to advance, compete and differentiate 
themselves successfully in their marketplace”.  
Furthermore, we highlight two definitions from the European Central Bank, and OECD and 
Eurostat. The European Central Bank (2017) states: “Innovation describes the development 
and application of ideas and technologies that improve goods and services or make their 
production more efficient”. Likewise, OECD and Eurostat (2018) states: “An innovation is a 
new or improved product or process (or combination thereof) that differs significantly from 
the unit’s previous products or processes and that has been made available to potential users 
(product) or brought into use by the unit (process)” (p. 32).  
In addition, OECD and Eurostat (2018, p. 34) defines two types of innovation: Product 
innovation and process innovation. A product innovation is a new or improved good or service 
that differs significantly from the firm’s previous goods or services and that has been 
introduced in the market. A business process innovation is a new or improved business process 
for one or more business functions that differs significantly from the firm’s previous business 
processes and that has been brought into use by the firm. 
Building on how innovation is defined in the literature, it is necessary to explain how to 
measure it. Next, we discuss the role of patents and why patents are suitable for measuring 
innovation. 
2.1.1 Patents 
“A patent is an exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or a process that 
provides, in general, a new way of doing something, or offers a new technical solution to a 
problem” (World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), n.d.A). As we can observe from 
this definition, there are many similarities to how we understand innovation. WIPO (n.d.a) 
describes that patents provides the right to prevent others from commercially exploiting the 
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patented invention which implies that the invention cannot be commercially made, used, 
distributed, imported, or sold by others without consent.  
Haus and Juranek (2014) describe that the purpose of the patent system is to encourage 
innovation. By allowing for time-restricted monopoly, inventors are able to generate profits. 
The underlying assumption is that innovation generates long-term social welfare which 
compensates for the short-term welfare loss of monopoly. The time-restricted monopoly refers 
to that granted patents are protected for 20 years from the filing date of the application (World 
Intellectual Property Organisation, n.d.a). 
In order to receive patent protection, the inventor must file a public patent application. Each 
patent application includes information about the patent inventor and patent applicant, 
including their respective host country. The host country of the patent inventor shows the 
location where the patented innovation was created, while the patent applicant shows the 
location of the legal owner subject to taxation (Böhm, Karkinsky, Knoll and Riedel, 2015).  
A patent is a territorial right, and the exclusive rights are only applicable in the country or 
region in which a patent has been filed and granted (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 
n.d.a). However, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) enables inventors to seek patent 
protection for an invention simultaneously in multiple countries by filing an international 
patent application (World Intellectual Property Organisation, n.d.b). An example is the 
European Patent Office (EPO), which provides inventors patent protection in up to 44 
European countries (European Patent Office, n.d.) and the opportunity to file for protection in 
several other countries through the PCT.  
In the literature, we find that patent data is the dominating measure of innovation. Several 
research papers use patent data for measuring innovation, including Akcigit et al. (2018), 
Mukherjeea, Singhb, and Žaldokas (2017), Böhm, Karkinsky, Knoll, and Riedel (2015), 
Atanassov and Liu (2015), Ernst, Richter, and Riedel (2014), Ernst and Spengel (2011) and 
Karkinsky and Riedel (2009).  
In a research review paper, Akcigit and Stantcheva (2020) argue that patents are by nature 
highly correlated to the quantity of innovation. Ernst and Spengel (2011) also that patents often 
are used as indicator for innovative activity and that patents and research & development 
(R&D) are closely related. Additionally, several empirical studies have found strong 
relationships between patents and R&D, including Griliches (1990), Hall, Griliches and 
Hausman (1986) and Bosch, Lederman, and Maloney (2005). 
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Although patents appear to be the dominating measure of innovation, we also find researchers 
who use other output measures, such as new products introduced in markets. We also find 
researchers who use other output measures, such as new products introduced in markets. We 
also find some researchers who use various input measures, such as R&D spending, discussed 
in Dechezleprêtre, Martin & Bassi (2016). 
However, the use of such measures does not appear to be widespread. The use of patents as a 
measure of innovation appears to be the established practice. Going forward, we therefore use 





Taxation is essential to the redistribution of wealth and gathering of public revenues in the 
modern welfare state. Tax revenues pay for public services such as infrastructure, courts of 
justice, national defence, health care and education (Smith, 2015). 
In recent decades, tax policies related to innovation have gained interest from governments in 
many European countries (Ernst, et al., 2014, p. 694). Accordingly, numerous European 
countries have made changes to their general tax policies. General tax policies refer to standard 
personal and corporate income taxation (Akcigit and Stantcheva, 2020, p. 3). 
We also observe increase in the use of specific tax policies. Specific tax policies refer to tax 
policies targeted at innovation (Akcigit & Stantcheva, 2020, p. 3). An example of this is patent 
boxes. A patent box is a tax regime that applies a lower corporate tax rate on income from 
patent ownership (Gaessler, Hall and Harhoff, 2018). 
According to Ernst et al. (2014), most countries tax patent income at the same tax rate as the 
corporate income tax rate (p. 700). In this study, we mainly focus on general tax policies in 
the form of corporate income tax rates. 
2.2.1 Corporate income tax 
A statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate represents the tax rate faced by a firm in a 
jurisdiction (OECD, 2020, p. 9). The statutory CIT rate measures the marginal tax that must 
be paid on an additional unit of income (OECD, 2020, p. 9). Because CIT rates are present in 
every European OECD country, CIT rates can be applied to compare corporate taxation both 
across jurisdictions and over time. In the report Corporate Tax Statistics, OECD (2020, p. 9) 
describe how the statutory CIT rates have declined worldwide the past decades.  
OECD (2021b) describes four ways to calculate the CIT rate: Central government CIT rate, 
adjusted central government CIT rate, sub-central government CIT rate and combined CIT 
rate. Though this is somewhat technical, it is important for the forthcoming analysis and 
discussion.  
The central government CIT rate shows the basic central government statutory (flat or top 
marginal) CIT rate, measured gross of a deduction (if any) for sub-central tax (OECD, 2021b).  
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The adjusted central government CIT rate shows the basic central government statutory CIT 
rate (inclusive of surtax (if any)), adjusted (if applicable) to show the net rate where the central 
government provides a deduction in respect of sub-central income tax (OECD, 2021b).  
The sub-central government CIT rate shows the basic sub-central (combined state/regional 
and local) statutory CIT rate, inclusive of sub-central surtax (if any) (OECD, 2021b).  
The combined CIT rate shows the basic combined central and sub-central (statutory) CIT rate 
given by the adjusted central government rate plus the sub-central rate (OECD, 2021b).   
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2.3 Empirical relationship between innovation and taxation 
Finally, we review literature on the empirical relationship between innovation and taxation 
and present the most interesting findings. In the review, we concentrate on research papers 
which study the impact of corporate taxation on patent application in the U.S. and Europe. The 
chapter are grouped by research paper. 
2.3.1 Taxation and Innovation in the 20th Century 
In the working paper Taxation and Innovation in the 20th Century, Akcigit et al. (2018) study 
the impact of personal and corporate taxation on innovation in the U.S. over the twentieth 
century.  
By utilising four comprehensive datasets, the researchers are able to study inventors and firms 
engaged in inventive activity between 1940 to 2000. The researchers are also adjusting for 
numerous changes in the U.S. tax code over the 20th century. The datasets include panel data 
of inventors who have patented since 1920, a dataset of employment, location, and patents of 
firms active in R&D since 1921, a state-level corporate tax database since 1900, and a database 
of state-level personal income taxes.  
Akcigit et al. (2018, p. 34) find that both personal and corporate taxes matter for innovation, 
and that the quantity, quality, and location of innovation are all affected by the U.S. tax system.  
Specifically, they find that higher corporate income taxes negatively affect the quantity and 
quality of innovative activity in U.S. They also find that corporate inventors respond more 
strongly to taxes compared to non-corporate inventors. 
2.3.2 Do corporate taxes hinder innovation?  
In the research paper Do Corporate Taxes Hinder Innovation?, Mukherjee, et al. (2017) study 
how changes in state-level corporate tax rates impact innovation in the U.S. from 1990 to 
2006.  
The researchers find that an increase in taxes reduced future innovation. Their estimates imply 
that when firms are affected by a tax increase, 67 percent of the firms file for approximately 
one less patent following the increase, compared to firms which are not exposed to a tax 
increase, while subject to similar economic conditions.  
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Interestingly, the researchers find that declines in innovation is not limited to patenting 
activity. Declines in patenting are also accompanied by declines in R&D expenditures and 
new product introductions (Mukherjee et al., 2017, p. 196). Thus, the researchers conclude 
that the effect of corporate taxation impacts all stages of innovation.  
2.3.3 Corporate Income Taxes, Financial Constraints and Innovation 
Similarly, in the working paper Corporate Income Taxes, Financial Constraints and 
Innovation, Atanassov and Liu (2015) study how changes in state-level corporate income taxes 
impact innovation in the U.S. from 1988 to 2006. They find that tax decreases significantly 
increase both quality and quantity of innovative output. Quantity is measured by number of 
patents while quality is measured by citations per patent. 
Atanassov and Liu (2015, p. 8) explain the reasoning behind this. After a tax decrease, firms 
are able to allocate resources from tax avoidance to innovative activity. This shift towards 
innovating activity typically appears two or more years after a tax decrease. Hence, where 
Mukherjee, et al. (2017) observe a stronger effect from tax increases, Atanassov and Liu 
(2015) observe a stronger effect from tax decreases. In fact, Atanassov and Liu (2015, p. 3) 
find that tax increases have little impact on innovation in the U.S. They explain that their 
results are especially relevant for more financially constrained firms, firms with weaker 
governance and firms that to a greater extent engage in tax avoidance (Atanassov & Liu, 2015, 
p. 7). The conflicting results appear to be caused by different estimation methodologies. 
Though these observations and results are noteworthy, we point out that all three papers are 
based on patent data from the U.S. patent office (USPTO). Next, we discuss two studies based 
on European patent data.  
2.3.4 Taxation, R&D Tax Incentives and Patent Application in Europe  
In the discussion paper Taxation, R&D Tax Incentives and Patent Application in Europe, Ernst 
and Spengel (2011) study how corporate income taxes affect R&D and patenting activity in 
20 European countries between 1998 to 2007.  
Ernst and Spengel (2011, p.26) find a negative effect of the combined statutory corporate 
income tax rate on the IP phase and the number of patent applications. The marginal effect is 
estimated as an increase of the average number of applications by 0.09 following a decrease 
of the corporate income tax rate of ten percentage points.  
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The researchers also find that larger firms are more sensitive to corporate income tax rates 
than smaller firms. In addition to increasing the number of patent applications, lower corporate 
income tax stimulates earlier R&D investments and attract patents developed in cooperation 
with foreign inventors, which increase the fiscal tax base and revenue in the host country (p. 
26).   
2.3.5 Corporate Taxation and the Choice of Patent Location within 
Multinational Firms 
Likewise, in the research paper Corporate Taxation and the Choice of Patent Location within 
Multinational Firms, Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) study how corporate income tax affect 
patenting activity in multinational firms between in 18 European countries 1995 to 2003.  
Furthermore, Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) study how multinational firms use patents to shift 
taxes to low-tax countries, minimising their corporate tax burden. They explain that profit 
shifting activities are larger in multinational firms with high IP holdings and high R&D 
incentives (p. 177) while using Microsoft and Pfizer as examples (p. 185).  
Karkinsky and Riedel (2009, p. 185) conclude that corporate tax rates exert a strong negative 
impact on the number of patent applications. An increase of one percentage point in the 
statutory corporate income tax rate reduces the number of patent applications to the European 
Patent Office by 3.5 percent. Moreover, the effect appears robust even when controlling for 
firm size and time-varying country characteristics. 
 
Noteworthily, all five papers find negative effects of corporate taxation on innovation in U.S. 
and Europe. Moreover, we observe that these papers study relatively short time periods 
compared to Akcigit et al. (2018). In addition, the most recent study in Europe, exploits data 
that dates back to 2007. Since we also know that many countries have reduced their statutory 




3. Methodology  
This chapter aims to describe the methodological framework used in this study. First, we 
describe the research design and the data collection process. Next, we develop the econometric 
model in order to explain the empirical relationship between innovation and corporate taxation 
across European OECD countries and over time. Last, we present our hypothesis. 
3.1 Research design 
To analyse the empirical relationship between innovation and corporate taxation, this study is 
based on a quantitative analysis with a deductive research approach. Because we combine 
cross-sectional and time series patent and taxation data, which requires advanced statistical 
analysis, the quantitative method become the natural choice. Given the nature of the thesis’ 
research question, the study follows a deductive approach. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
(2009, p. 124) explain that the deductive approach involves developing a hypothesis which 
subsequently is tested using empirical data. The deductive approach also allows an explanatory 
design since we aim to explain the relationship between two variables. In order to explain such 
relationship, we develop an econometric model which we use to determine whether to reject 
the null hypothesis. 
3.2 Data collection 
The study collects secondary data from several databases. These are combined to create a 
unique panel dataset of patent applications and corporate income tax rates across 26 European 
OECD countries between 1981 to 2017. This chapter explains the process behind the 
collection, merging, and modification of these datasets. To perform these computations, we 
use the programming language R. 
3.2.1 Patent data 
The data on patents are retrieved from the “OECD, REGPAT database, January 2021” 
(OECD, 2021a). This database provides datasets that fully originate from the EPO’s 
Worldwide Statistical Patent Database (PATSTAT Global, Autumn 2020). The database 
covers patent applications by priority date (first filing) filed to the EPO from 1977, and patent 
applications filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) at international phase from 
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1977. The REGPAT database provides patent applications to the EPO on 5,500 regions across 
205 countries, including all European countries. This amounts to 3,990,540 observations in 
total, of which 1,893,944 observations are obtained from European countries. 
3.2.2 Taxation data 
The taxation data originate from the OECD Tax Database. The database provides statutory 
corporate and capital income taxes for OECD countries from primarily year 2000 to 2020 
(OECD, 2021b). The database also consists of a dataset of historical statutory corporate and 
capital income taxes from 1981 to 1999 (OECD, 2008). Merging these two datasets provides 
inter alia corporate income tax covering all 26 European OECD countries1 over a period of 39 
years, amounting to 983 observations. However, in the dataset from 1981-1999, there are some 
missing values for countries that either became members of the OECD during the time period, 
or more recently. 
3.2.3 Panel data 
Using the patent data from the REGPAT database with patent applications to the EPO, we are 
able to count the number of patents per country per year. Simultaneously, we remove 
duplicates due to multiple applicants sharing application rights. Last, we merge the count of 
patent application data with the taxation data and create the panel dataset. 
A panel dataset is a dataset that combines cross-sectional and time series data. We denote the 
number of cross-sectional European OECD countries by I = 26 and the number of time periods 
by T = 36. Without any missing values, this would amount to a balanced panel of 936 
observations. However, there are missing values, and we modify the panel for certain 
observations.  
Although we have data from 1981 to 2020, we must shorten the time period from 2020 to 
2017. This is because there is approximately 31-month lag from the patent’s priority date until 
the patent is included in the OECD REGPAT database (OECD, 2004). Because this process 
takes about two to three years, the observations from 2018 to 2020 are considered unreliable 
and removed from the panel. 
 
1 European OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
 
 15 
We also have to control for countries that have experienced political changes during the time 
period. Specifically, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia have 
experienced unique alterations to their political systems during the time period. For this reason, 
we have removed observations of these countries for specific periods2.   
Furthermore, it is necessary to add control variables into the panel. For this reason, we gather 
data about EPO membership and GDP. EPO memberships are retrieved from the EPO website 
which shows each country’s entry data in the EPO (EPO, 2019). We also gather data on gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita annual percentage growth in local currency per country 
per year, and GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars for each country per year. Both datasets 
are sourced from the World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank’s DataBank 
(World Bank, 2021a; World Bank, 2021b).  
The final variable added to the panel is population per country and year. Population data is 
sourced from Eurostat Database “Population on 1 January by age and sex” (Eurostat, 2021). 
This variable is not an independent variable in the analysis, but it is included to compute the 
number of patent applications per 100,000 capita per year. By adjusting for population, we 
create a more comparable measure of patent applications when comparing countries. This 
variable represents our dependent variable in the analyses.  
We also remove the observations with missing values, so that the number of observations for 
all variables are equal. After the modifications, we are left with 796 observations in the panel. 
  
 
2 Observations are removed for Czech Republic (1981-1992), Germany (1981-1990), Latvia (1981-1990), 
Slovakia (1981-1992) and Slovenia (1981-1991). 
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3.3 Data analysis 
An econometric analysis generally begins with the premise that y and x are two variables, 
representing some population, while we are interested in study how y is impacted by changes 
in x (Wooldridge, 2016, p. 22). This premise is applicable in this study, where we analyse how 
changes in corporate taxation impact innovation.  
In this chapter, we introduce the econometric model based on fixed effects. Here, we also 
introduce the different variables, confounders, and potential omitted variables. Last, we 
introduce our hypothesis. 
3.3.1 Fixed effects estimation  
The general two-way fixed effects model is given by: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where individual i = 1, 2, ..., I and time t = 1, 2, ...., T. 
In the general model we have an independent variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 that differs between both cross-
sectional individuals and over time. We also have a decomposed error term 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The 
components are separated to only be dependent on time (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖), differ only between cross-
sectional individuals (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) and vary across time and cross-sections (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). These three error 
components together form the stochastic error term (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). The point is that we need to control 
adequately for all three variations. By adding control variables and using a within group 
transformation, we are able to take into account the cross-sectional and time fixed effects 
(Wooldridge, 2016).  
The specific two-way fixed effects model is given by: 
                       log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 +
                                                          𝑌𝑌𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
Where country i = 1, 2, …, 36 and years t = 1, 2, …, 26. 
The country- and year-fixed effects are included in order to account for the average impact of 
unobservable time-invariant differences between countries and unobservable variables that 
differ over time but are constant over countries.  
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With year fixed effects we are controlling for factors that impact all countries equally in 
different years. This means that we control for occurrences that are year specific and that could 
affect innovation. By running an OLS regression on the two-way fixed effects model with 
control variables, we can estimate the robust effect that CIT rates have on the number of 
patents per 100,000 capita while accounting for country-level heterogeneity and time shocks.  
In addition to fixed effects, clustered standard errors are used in the model. As explained by 
Abadie, Athey, Imbens and Wooldridge (2017), including clustered standard errors is 
applicable in an experimental design situation when clusters are not randomly sampled and 
there is heterogeneity in the treatment effects. These recommendations indicate that clustered 
standard errors are relevant for our model, as the countries and differences between them are 
systematic and not random.  
The reason we include clustered standard errors is to reduce the risk of biased standard errors 
which otherwise could lead to incorrect inference about the estimators’ statistical significance 
(Hansen, 2007). This bias can occur in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
in the standard errors within a country (Hanck, Arbold, Gerber & Schmelzer, 2020).  
We confirm the need to cluster standard errors by running a Breusch-Godfrey test for serial 
correlation, and a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity in the idiosyncratic error. The tests 
are shown in appendix figure A.1 and figure A.2.  
3.3.2 The dependent variable 
For the dependent variable in the model, we apply the natural logarithm to the number of 
patent applications per 100,000 capita per country per year (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). By using the natural 
logarithm, the output of the regression is easier to interpret. 
The dependent variable in the model derives from the count of number of patent applications 
per country per year. By using the population for the associated country in the patent 
application, we are able to compute the number of patent applications per 100,000 capita per 
country per year. To apply the natural logarithm to the dependant variable, patents applications 
per 100,000 is calculated with the formula:  
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 100 000𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
1 +  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ 100 000 
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The reason why 1 is added to the number of patent applications is that there are observations 
of zero patent applications. When applying the natural logarithm, we cannot have zero values 
since the log of zero is undefined. Adding 1 to the observations handles this problem. This 
means that there is a slight inaccuracy in the regression’s dependent variable. However, since 
all observations of patent applications are added 1, the ratio does not change in size and the 
overall effect that is measured in the analysis remains unchanged. 
Adjusting the dependent variable for population is necessary because the countries in the panel 
vary considerably in population. Accordingly, adjusting for population creates a variable that 
is comparable across all countries.   
3.3.3 The independent variables 
The model applies the combined corporate income tax rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) as the independent 
variable. We have earlier described that the combined CIT rate shows the basic combined 
central and sub-central CIT rate (OECD, 2021b). 𝛽𝛽1 is the coefficient of the independent 
variable.  
In the model, we apply the natural logarithm to the dependent variable. The interpretation of 
the 𝛽𝛽1-coefficient is therefore that 1 unit increase in the independent variable 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 implies 
100 ∗ 𝛽𝛽1 percent change in the dependent variable 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. As the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 observations 
in the panel are in the interval [0, 100], the 1-unit increase is equal to 1 percentage point 
increase in the interpretation of the 𝛽𝛽1-coefficient.  
In chapter 2.2, we introduced four different tax variables which all have been considered as 
potential independent variables. Here, we described the differences between central 
government CIT rate, adjusted central government CIT rate, sub-central government CIT rate 
and combined CIT rate. Due to a considerable number of missing values (NAs) of adjusted 
central government CIT rate and sub-central CIT rate, these two variables are not considered 
reasonable alternatives. However, both central government (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅) and combined CIT rate 
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) have reasonable numbers of observations. Thus, both appear to be reasonable 
choices of independent variables.  
There are a few reasons why we use the combined CIT rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) as the independent 
variable. First, Ernst and Spengel (2011) argue that the use of the combined CIT rate includes 
the taxation of profits from intellectual property (IP) by focusing only on the taxation of 
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returns. Because the combined CIT rate is not affected by the tax shields from financing, this 
is therefore an appropriate measure of the tax burden. 
Second, the correlation between the central government CIT rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅) and combined CIT 
rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is high. This correlation is estimated to 87.8 %. Furthermore, in the panel, we 
only find a few observations within nine countries where the two variables differ. This may 
indicate that both variables will absorb the same effects in the regression. In appendix 8.2, we 
show that the implications of using this independent variable (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is minimal compared 
to using the central government CIT rate.  
Third, the applicant is eligible to pay tax within the country to which a patent is applied for. 
For example, we assume that all German patent applications are filed by German firms. 
Because German firms are eligible to pay both sub-central CIT and central government CIT, 
this will be absorbed by the combined CIT. We find support for this argument in the literature. 
In a research paper, Böhm et al. (2015) find that the patent inventor and patent applicant were 
located in different countries in only 8 % of patent applications in Europe from 1990 to 2007. 
3.3.4 Control variables 
The control variables used in the model are EPO membership, GDP per capita and GDP 
growth per capita. These are all variables that we need to include in order to enhance the 
internal validity of the regression, as they explain variation in the dependent variable.  
We control for countries’ EPO memberships (EPOm) because being a member of the EPO 
makes it easier to file for international patents. Consequently, when a country becomes a 
member of the EPO, there is an observable increase in patent applications. EPOm is a dummy 
variable of 0 as long as the country is not a member of EPO and becomes 1 when the country 
becomes a member of EPO. 
In the literature, GDP is also a common control variable used in several similar studies 
(Akcigit et al., 2018; Atanassov & Liu, 2015; Ernst & Spengel, 2011; Karkinsky & Riedel, 
2009). Hence, GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars is added to control for economy size, 
economic activity and living standards. We use the natural logarithm of GDP to adjust for the 
differences in scale compared to the other variables. GDP growth (GDPG) is also added as a 
control variable, in order to control for economic growth.  
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3.3.5 Confounders and potential omitted variables  
In addition to control variables, we have to discuss the confounders in our model and how we 
adjust for them. In our analyses, we use two-way fixed effects to adjust for unobserved time-
invariant confounders, such as omitted variables. As Hill, Griffiths and Lim (2017) put it, this 
is one of the advantages of using fixed effects on panel data, as when the data is transformed 
all unmeasured characteristics of the country and year are subtracted out.  
Generally, the country-specific fixed effects are unobservable, time-constant factors that affect 
the dependent variable and are often referred to as the unobserved heterogeneity. This can for 
example be public infrastructure. The reason for this is that i.e., the level of public services is 
usually correlated with taxation, but to measure quality and quantity of public infrastructure 
is difficult (Bartik (1991); Phillips & Goss (1995)). Another example of a country-specific 
unobservable effect could be that some countries have a culture that is more positive to 
innovation and change than other countries, and therefore apply for more patents.  
The other fixed effect included in the analyses is year-specific fixed effects. By including 
these, we are able to control for unobservable variables that vary over time but are constant 
across countries. Examples of this type of effects could be the introduction of computers and 
internet making it easier to apply for patents, economic crises or large changes in supply or 
demand in certain industries.  
3.3.6 Hypothesis 
The regression model estimates the average effect of corporate income tax rates on the number 
of patent applications per hundred thousand capita in European OECD countries from the 
years 1981 to 2017. The β-coefficient of  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents this effect. The effect is analysed 
to answer the research question: How do corporate tax rates impact the number of patent 
applications in Europe?   
In order to study this research question, we draw up a two-sided hypothesis which we analyse 
through our fixed effects model: 
Ho: β-coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖variable = 0 
H1: β-coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖variable ≠ 0 
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If the β-coefficient is statistically significant, we can reject the null hypothesis that corporate 
tax rates do not impact the number of patent applications in European countries. In that case, 
the β-coefficient is such that an increase in the corporate tax rate of 1 percentage point in a 




This chapter provides an overview of the analysis in this study. First, we present descriptive 
statistics of the panel. Next, we present several regression analyses and explain how we 
interpret the results. Last, we discuss the robustness of the analysis.  
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
This chapter aims to show the underlying structure of our data. This will be useful when 
explaining and discussing the results. We begin by presenting descriptive statistics of the 
patent and taxation data individually. Then, we present descriptive statistics of the constructed 
data panel.  
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics for patent data  
Figure 1 shows the development of number of patent applications for the 26 countries in the 
panel each year from 1981 to 2020. Overall, the graph shows a steady increase in patent 
applications. However, the steep decrease from 2017 to 2020 is noteworthy. We have included 
this graph to visualise the average 31-month lag effect on EPO filing date to publication date 
in the dataset, as presented in chapter 3.2. Accordingly, we limit the time-period to 1981 to 
2017 in order to exclude unwanted effects in the analysis. The number of patent applications 
in 1981 and 2017 also turn out to be the minimum and maximum observations. In this period, 
the number of patent applications has increased by 684 %. 
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Figure 1: Development of number of patent applications for the complete panel (1981-2020)
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Figure 2 shows the development of patent applications per 100,000 capita (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝) from 
1981 to 2017. The bold black line shows the mean development for all countries in the panel. 
Additionally, we add a sample of countries to the graph, in order to give a broader picture of 
how innovation have developed in the various countries. From this graph, we observe that the 
mean of patent applications per 100,000 capita steadily increases during the time period. 
There are a few countries, namely Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, and Germany, which appear 
to have experienced a substantial increase in approximately the time period from 1993 to 2002. 
Countries such as France, Ireland and Norway also have a steady increase in the time period. 
While the observations from France coincide pretty well with the mean, the two latter countries 
appear to be just below the mean for all years. Other countries on the other hand, such as Great 
Britain, Italy, and Spain, have seen a much smaller increase over the period. 
This graph reflects how innovative each country is. We observe that there are pretty substantial 
differences between countries, and that there also are large differences in change within each 
country. While the variance in innovativeness in 1981 is pretty low, this has changed over the 
years, and in 2017 the variance in innovativeness between the countries is larger.  
During the 1980’s, there are about the same number of countries above the mean as below the 
mean, and the average trend is a relatively subtle but steady increase in patent applications. 
During the early 1990’s we observe that the mean declines, while at the same time a number 
of countries keep increasing. For example, Finland and Denmark move above the mean in 
these years. Great Britain and France also have a slight decrease in the early 1990’s. From 
mid-90’s to 2000 however, several countries experience a steep increase, pulling the mean 
upwards. We also observe that the majority of the countries (six of eleven) move above mean 
in the 1990’s.  
From year 2000 to 2010, the mean indicates that the increase rate is about the same as in the 
1990’s. However, several countries experience sizeable year-to-year differences. France also 
moves below the mean in 2005. From 2010 to 2017, several of the highly innovative countries 
experience substantial decreases, namely Sweden, Finland, and Germany. A few countries 
have almost a convex development in these ten years, namely Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, 
and Norway. Finally, France experiences a decrease from 2015 to 2017. 
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Figure 2: Development of Patent applications per 100 000 capita (pats_pht), mean and for a sample of countries (1981–2017)
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4.1.2 Descriptive statistics for taxation data 
Figure 3 shows the development of the combined corporate income tax rate (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅) from 
1981 to 2017 for the same sample of countries as in figure 2. Again, the bold black line shows 
the mean development of all countries in the panel. This shows how the mean combined CIT 
rate has progressed over time. The 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 appears to have been steadily decreasing from 1985. 
The maximum mean of 40.96 % is observed in 1985 while the minimum mean of 20.22 % is 
observed in 2017.  
As the mean illustrate, we observe that for the most countries, the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 has steadily declined. 
There are however a few countries that have a steep decline in certain periods. For example, 
Finland has a steep decline of 36.75 percentage points from 1985 to 1993 and Sweden has a 
steep decline of 30.1 percentage points from 1989 to 1991. Ireland has a steep decline of 23.5 
percentage points from 1997 to 2003 and Germany a steep decline from 1997 to 2001 of 18.54 
percentage points.  
France on the other hand stands out with its many fluctuations from the mean. Their 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 
was at 50 % from 1981-1985, while steadily decreasing to 33.33% in 1993, following an 
increase to 41.66 % in 1997, followed by a decrease to 34.43 % in 2010, followed by a steady 
increase to 44.43 % in 2017. Of all the countries in the panel, France is furthest away from the 
mean. Other countries also experience slight increases in the period, but the general trend is 
negative. 
We observe that most countries’ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 are above the mean in 1981 and for the most part of 
the 1980’s. During the late 1980’s and early 1990’s there seems to have been a change, as 
most countries either decline or below the mean in this period and through the 1990’s. From 
approximately year 2000 however, an increasing number of countries’ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 increases above 




Figure 3: Development of Combined corporate income tax rates (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅), mean and for a sample of countries (1981– 2017)
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4.1.3 Descriptive statistics for panel data 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of all variables in the panel. Here, there are a couple of 
things that can be addressed. Because the panel is unbalanced, we have 796 observations in 
total.  
We observe considerable variation in the number of patent application. Here, the standard 
deviation is greater than the mean indicating large variations between countries. We also 
observe similar tendencies in patent applications per 100,000 inhabitants. For example, this 
might hint to large differences in the countries’ abilities to innovate. Additionally, we note that 
the mean and median of patent applications differ, meaning that the variable is asymmetrical. 
For instance, a few observations might pull the mean up. 
However, it may not be intuitive that the minimum of patent applications per 100,000 
inhabitants are equal to 0.02 when the minimum of patent application is equal to zero. Again, 
we point out that this is because the variable patent applications per 100,000 inhabitants is 
computed to be applicable with the natural logarithm. 
The last four variables are used as control variables. The dummy variable EPOm’s mean tells 
us that in 80 % of the observations a country is a member of EPO. We observe high standard 
deviations in GDPG, GDP and population due to considerable variation in country economic 
size and situation. For example, minimum and maximum population is respectively 279,049 
(Iceland, 2000) and 82,536,680 (Germany, 2003). Given this, variation in other variables is 





Table 1: Descriptive statistics of panel data 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max 
 
Patent applications 796 1,958.41 3,925.98 0 65 462.5 2,014.8 24,933 
Patents per 100 000 capita 796 11.32 15.59 0.02 0.91 6.08 13.95 94.21 
Combined corporate income tax rate  (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅)  796 31.76 10.93 9 25 30 38.3 62 
EPO membership 796 0.80 0.40 0 1 1 1 1 
Gross domestic product per capita growth 796 2.10 3.10 -14.27 0.69 2.03 3.55 23.99 
Gross domestic product per capita 796 28,008.80 20,794.53 2,429.21 13,098.58 23,050.67 38,869.19 118,823.60 




To provide additional understanding of the dependent variable and the main independent 
variable, we visualise the data with histograms combined with the kernel density estimate 
curve with a Gaussian distribution. This means that the y-axis is not modelled with frequencies 
but reflect the probability density.  
Figure 4 shows the histogram of patent applications per 100 000 inhabitants and the density 
estimate curve. What we grasp from this visualisation of the data is that it is right-skewed. 
There appears to be a lot of observations between 0 to 5 patent applications per 100 000, while 
we have a decreasing number of observations as the variable increases in size.  
There also seems to be some applications per 100 000 at around 70 to 80. This could for 
example be explained by a country that is highly innovative but still has a relatively small 
population, such as Switzerland or Luxembourg. This corresponds to the descriptive statistics 
of the variable, where the mean was 12.02 with a standard deviation of 16.17 while the median 
was at 6.63. 
 
Figure 4: Histogram of Patent applications per 100 000 capita 
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Figure 5 on the other hand displays a histogram of the combined corporate income tax rates 
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅) in the panel, along with the density estimate curve. This histogram might seem bell 
shaped at first sight, but as the tails are cut off, it does seem to be more of a truncated 
distribution. This can be explained by the nature of the variable. It is extremely rare to observe 
tax rates at 0 % or 100 %, and as we see from the histogram of our sample, the cut off-points 
are approximately at 5 % and 55 %. As the descriptive statistics also indicate, most 
observations are in the interval of 25 % to 30 %.  
 
 




4.2 Regression analyses 
In this chapter we present, discuss, and interpret the regression analyses. The analysis is 
divided in two parts. First, we run a regression of the entire panel from 1981 and 2017. Second, 
we split the panel in four time periods, and run regressions of each time period: 1981-1989; 
1990-1999; 2000-2009; 2010-2017. Analysing each time period separately makes it possible 
to capture potential variation between different periods.  
4.2.1 Regression of entire period 
Table 2 present the regression of the entire panel from 1981 to 2017 using the FE-model. Here, 
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of patent applications per 100,000 capita 
denoted as log(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝) in the table.  
Column (1) shows the regression with only the isolated independent tax variable. Column (2) 
includes both independent tax variable and control variables. This column represents the 
econometric model introduced in chapter 3.3. 
From the regressions in Table 2, we perceive that an increased tax rate seems to have a negative 
effect on patent applications. When we run the regression with fixed effects but without 
controls, the effect is significant. However, with the robust model including both fixed effects 
and controls, the effect decreases and is no longer significant. The difference in size and 
significance between these two β-estimates is therefore due to that some of the effects on 
patent applications are explained by the controls. We will not discuss these controls in depth, 
but as they are all significant, we seem to have included necessary and important control 
variables in our model.  
Although the β-coefficient for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 in column (2) is not significant, the effect is as the 
literature suggest, and as we expect, negative. This means that we cannot conclude that an 
increase in combined corporate income tax rates of 1 percentage point decreases the number 
of patent applications per 100 000 inhabitants by 0.7%, but it gives us an indication that the 
effect is negative.  
As we discussed in the descriptive statistics chapter, we observe in Figure 2 that the growth 
rate of the number of patent applications during the 36 years of observations has on average 
varied greatly. The same can be said for the combined CIT rate. Additionally, as mentioned 
the are a few observations missing from some countries in the first 10 to 15 years in our panel, 
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which might affect the estimation of the β-coefficient. We therefore find it necessary to divide 
the analysis in four periods to study 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅’s effect on 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_ 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝 in different decades. 
 
Table 2: Linear Panel Regression Model of Tax Effects on Patent Applications 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 log(pats_pht) 
 (1) (2) 
 
CCITR -0.016* -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.006) 
   
EPOm  0.512*** 
  (0.131) 
   
GDPG  -0.009* 
  (0.005) 
   
log(GDP)  1.062*** 
  (0.214) 
    
Observations 796 796 
R2 0.036 0.472 
Adjusted R2 -0.046 0.425 
F Statistic 27.095*** (df = 1; 733) 163.405*** (df = 4; 730) 
 
Notes: Both regressions estimated using OLS on the two-way FE-model, estimating the 
independent variable CCITR’s effect in the dependent variable patents per 100 thousand 
capita (pats_pht). All regressions are included country and year fixed effects. (1) is based 
on the two-way FE-model without controls. (2) is the full two-way FE-model with controls 
as presented in methodology. All controls’ coefficients included. Standard errors clustered 




4.2.2 Regression of time periods 
Table 3 presents the regression divided in four time-periods using the FE-model. The reason 
why we divide the panel in four periods is that we wish to see if the combined CIT rate affects 
the number of patent applications differently during different decades.  
The panel has its first observation in 1981 and last in 2017. This implies that we cannot divide 
in perfect decades, and that the first period is nine years, second and third periods are ten years, 
and the fourth periods is eight years. Ideally, the analysis would be divided in four decades, 
but we do not consider this to be problematic for the interpretation of the regression.  
In the first time period (1981 – 1989), the β-coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 (-0.4 %) is slightly negative. 
This means that an increase in the combined CIT rate reduces the number of patent 
applications in the period. 
This period has the least observations of 135. This is nearly half as many as in the third time-
period where we find a similar but significant effect. In chapter 3.2, we describe why we 
remove certain countries due to unique political alterations. Furthermore, we are missing tax 
data on Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Poland in this time period. 
Due to these circumstances in the data, this estimate can be seen as less statistically reliable 
when comparing time periods.  
Another element that may affect the estimation of the coefficient can be seen in  of the 
descriptive statistics. Here we see that that the mean combined CIT rate increases from 1981 
to 1983 and moves almost horizontally from 1983 to 1985, before declining from 1985. At the 
same time, the mean number of patent applications increase rapidly from 1981 to 1985. The 
increase and horizontal development in the combined CIT rate are contrary to the trend from 
1985 to 2017, at which it declines. 
Compared to the first period, the regression results of the second period (1990-99) are very 
similar. Both the estimated β-coefficients and standard error of the independent variable 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 are identical. However, this is not due to identical movements in the underlying data, 
which we observe in figure 2 and figure 3. 
In the second period, the mean combined CIT rate declines by nearly 10 percentage points. 
This is a dramatic decline implying that the mean combined CIT rate declined by 
approximately 1 percentage point each year. The Nordic countries, especially Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland, are strong contributors to this decline.  
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Furthermore, the movement in the mean number of patent applications experiences a drawback 
in the first half of the period. In fact, after a nine-year period of growth, the mean number of 
patent applications decline from 1990 to 1993. Combined with the decline in combined CIT 
rate, there does not seem to be a negative effect within these years, which might affect the β-
estimate for the 1990’s. From 1993 to 1999 however, patent applications continue to increase. 
A contributing factor to why we do not find a significant negative effect in this period may be 
that the number of patent applications declines before it increases, while at the same time 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 declines.  
On another note, we observe that the number of observations has risen to 195. This is because, 
as explained earlier, observations from additional countries are included in the panel at this 
point.  
In the third time period (2000 – 2009), we observe that the estimated β-coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅  
increases in strength and becomes significant at the 10 %-level. 
As pointed out in the descriptive statistics, the mean number of patent applications grows 
considerably in this period. At the same time, the mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 decreases steadily. Although 
some of a special case, Ireland increases their patent applications rapidly, while at the same 
time drastically decreasing their 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 in this period. We observe few countries in the 2000’s 
that have an opposite development in the innovation and tax measures to the mean, which may 
explain why the estimate in this time period is significant.  
Interestingly, we note that our results in this period are similar compared to the findings of 
Ernst and Spengel (2011). In their study, Ernst and Spengel (2011) find a negative effect of 
the combined CIT rate on the number of patent applications in Europe between 1998 to 2007. 
The similar findings and the significance of our β-coefficient is not surprising as we analyse a 
similar time period as applied by Ernst and Spengel (2011). However, we only find 
significance at 10 %-level. This may imply that the empirical relationship is not as strong as 
expected. 
An interesting question is whether the financial crisis in 2007/08 impacts our results. In 
contrast, Ernst and Spengel (2011) do not include the financial crisis in their data. However, 
we observe that the increase in patent applications slows down from 2007 to 2008 and decline 
from 2008 to 2009. This is likely an effect of the crisis.  
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Considering taxation, we also know that the crisis led to two conflicting measures. On the one 
hand, several countries required public revenues to help recovering the economy. In these 
countries, the solution became to increase the taxes (Hallerberg, 2012). In our panel, this 
includes namely Portugal, Greece, and Iceland. On the other hand, some countries decreased 
taxes to stimulate the economy. As shown in figure 3, the overall trend in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 in our panel 
was negative in this period.  
In the fourth time period (2010 – 2017), there are several interesting incidents that must be 
discussed. Here, the β-coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 switches sign from negative to positive and is 
significant at the 10%-level. Intuitively, the interpretation is that an increase of 1 percentage 
point in the combined CIT rate increases the number of patent applications by 1.3 %. This is 
contrary to the β-coefficient in the three previous time periods where an increase in tax 
implicates a reduction in the number of patent applications.  
This appears to have a reasonable explanation. From 1983 to 2009, the mean development in 
both the number of patent applications and combined CIT rate are moving in opposite 
directions. Until 2010, the trend in the number of patent applications is positive while the trend 
in the combined CIT rate is negative. However, from 2010 to 2017, the trend of increasing 
patent applications stops. We observe from figure 2 that the mean number of patents decreases 
and then the trend flattens. At the same time, we observe from figure 3 that the mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 
appears to flatten before it declines slightly from 2013.  
From 2009 to 2010, the number of patent applications experience a large increase. Although 
we observe similar movements in previous years, this increase appears to be more systematic 
than previous movements. For example, in the time around the financial crisis in 2007/08, we 
observe several declines, namely in Finland, Netherlands, Great Britain, and Italy. Although 
the mean also declines between 2007 to 2009, this effect has a more natural-looking shape. 
In contrast, the spike in patent applications in 2010 appears to be considerably more 
systematic. Here, the mean clearly increases from 14.55 in 2009 to 16.63 in 2010 before it 
declines back to 15.57 in 2011. In 2010, the EPO introduced a new rule (Rule 36 EPC) 
concerning divisional patents (EPO, n.d.). Sometimes the parent application needs to be split 
into multiple distinct inventions in order to be granted as multiple divisional applications. In 
short, this rule shortened the time frame in which applicants had to divide parent applications 
in divisional applications. This contributes to explains the systematic spike.  
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Despite the effect of the new rule, the mean number of patent application continues to decline 
from 2012 to 2014. While the effect from 2009 to 2011 appears to be explained by the new 
rule, the decline from 2012 to 2014 must have another explanation. For example, it may be 
after-effects of the financial crisis. From 2014 the trend seems to again turn, and we observe 
an increase from here on out. This may be a sign that the economic activity moves back to a 
more normal pace.  
The increase in mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 from 2010 to 2013 may also be explained by the effects of the 
financial crisis. A couple of countries with weak corporate sectors and small open economies, 
i.e. Hungary, Latvia and Portugal, increased their corporate taxes temporarily from 2010 to 
handle sovereign debt following the financial crisis (Hallerberg, 2012). We observe that an 
increase in tax, temporary or not, applies to seven countries in our panel, while the rest either 
kept their corporate tax rate flat or decreased slightly. This increase and lack of big variations 
of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅s within countries, while at the same time we see large variations in slope of within-
country patent applications may explain why we get a positive and significant result.   
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Table 3: Linear Panel Regression Model of Tax Effects on Patent Applications divided in 
four time periods 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 log(pats_pht) 
 (1981-89) (1990-99) (2000-10) (2010-17) 
 
CCITR -0.004 -0.004 -0.017* 0.013* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
     
EPOm 0.313*** 0.512*** 0.163  
 (0.097) (0.176) (0.102)  
     
GDPG 0.027 -0.016 -0.008 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) 
     
log(GDP) 0.996** 0.063 1.349*** 0.122 
 (0.413) (0.239) (0.275) (0.272) 
      
Observations 135 193 260 208 
R2 0.248 0.242 0.432 0.015 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.084 0.334 -0.185 
F Statistic 8.904
***  
(df = 4; 108) 
12.678***  
(df = 4; 159) 
41.960***  
(df = 4; 221) 
0.895  
(df = 3; 172) 
 
Notes: All regressions estimated using OLS on the two-way FE-model presented in 
methodology. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Column 1 includes all 
observations in the 1980’s, column 2 includes all observations in the 1990’s, column 3 
includes all observations in the 2000’s, column 4 includes all observations in the 2010’s. 
All controls’ coefficients included. Standard errors clustered at country-level reported in 





4.3 Robustness analysis 
To test if the results of the main regression in Table 2 are correct, we run a series of robustness 
checks to see if 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅’s coefficient changes in size or significance. We have done five 
alterations to the panel and run the regression model on these data. Table 5 shows the results 
of these checks. By running these checks, we are able to see if some countries affect the results 
in such a way that they should be excluded from the analysis.  
In the first test we check to see if highly innovative countries have a significant tax effect. We 
suspect that since the mean number of patents have increased in the time period, while 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 
has decreased, we might be able to produce results similar to the analyses in the literature 
review if we only analyse the 6 countries with the highest 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_ 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝 means. These six 
countries are Luxembourg, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Netherlands. From 
column (1) in Table 5, we observe that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅’s coefficient indeed is negative and significant 
at the 10 %-level.  
Because this result is significant, it is interesting to see if we get a similar effect if we remove 
the 6 least innovative countries from the panel. Removing the least innovative countries will 
check if we have countries in our panel that are so little innovative that they prevent us from 
finding a significant effect of taxes on innovation.  
In the second test, we therefore exclude the six least innovative countries measured by the 
lowest mean 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_ 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝. These countries are Slovakia, Poland, Greece, Portugal, Lithuania, 
and Latvia. As we see from 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅’s β-coefficient in column (2), the result of excluding the 
least innovative countries from the panel does not yield any huge difference from the results 
in the main regression. The effect of taxes on patent applications increases slightly, but we do 
not observe any change in significance. We do however observe that most of the least 
innovative countries, measured in mean 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_ 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝, also have missing observations in the 
panel.  
To check if missing values in general is a problem in our analysis, we run a regression in 
column (3) where countries with any missing data are excluded. In the third test, we exclude 
countries Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia. The result suggests that missing values does not affect the 
results and that this is properly handled by the statistics software. In addition, we have missing 
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values in fairly random countries, as these countries are spread across high/medium/low 
innovative and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅. 
The checks in column (1) and (2) test based on innovativeness. The test in column (4) tests to 
see if we get a different result if we exclude the six countries with the lowest mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅s. 
These countries are Lithuania, Latvia, Iceland, Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia. The test in 
column (5) tests the opposite, removing the 6 countries that have the highest mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅s. 
These countries are Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Portugal, Greece. 
As we see in column (4), excluding the countries with low taxes does not influence the 
estimated effect in terms of significance, but the effect increases to -1.0%. Excluding high-tax 
countries (5) yields a similar result, as the effect increases to -1.2%, but not significant either. 
The reason we test for this is to see if countries with a low or high mean tax rate influence the 
tax effect for the remaining countries. The difference in results between these two tests can be 
explained, as a large part of the low-tax countries have little within-country variation in tax 
over time, while the high-tax countries vary more.  
All robustness checks provide a coefficient for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 that is equal to (column 3) or similar to 
(column 2 & 4) the same coefficient in the main regression. The results of the test in column 
1 is not very surprising as these countries have all experienced great within-country variation 
in addition to having a high mean 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_ 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝. This is picked up by our fixed-effects model, 
and therefore creates a significant β-coefficient. Although the effect in test (1) is similar to 
what we find in the related literature, the sample is rather small and not representative for all 
European countries. 
These tests further strengthen our results, as the effect that we find in the main regression do 
not seem to deviate with any alteration that seems relevant to the results. Therefore, we argue 




Table 4: Robustness checks 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 log(pats_pht) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
CCITR -0.016* -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
      
EPOm 0.719*** 0.455*** 0.667*** 0.623*** 0.458*** 
 (0.066) (0.141) (0.177) (0.154) (0.148) 
      
GDPG -0.006 -0.010 0.004 -0.007 -0.013** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
      
log(GDP) 0.453 0.658** 0.597** 0.906*** 1.014*** 
 (0.300) (0.270) (0.269) (0.257) (0.253) 
      
 
Observations 193 631 555 657 584 
R2 0.551 0.394 0.412 0.515 0.442 
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.332 0.349 0.468 0.380 
F Statistic 45.034
***  
(df = 4; 147) 
92.999***  
(df = 4; 571) 
87.730***  
(df = 4; 500) 
158.798***  
(df = 4; 597) 
103.960***  
(df = 4; 524) 
 
Notes: All regressions estimated using OLS on the two-way FE-model, estimating the 
independent variable CCITR’s effect in the dependent variable patents per 100 thousand 
capita (pats_pht). All regressions are included country and year fixed effects. All controls’ 
coefficients included. Standard errors clustered at country-level reported in parentheses. 




In addition to the robustness checks, there are a few aspects that also may influence our results. 
First, we omit observations where any of the variables are missing. This is done due to the 
sourced data on different variables not being complete. Although some observations from 
different countries have been intentionally omitted due to political issues, having complete 
data without missing values for all other observations would strengthen the robustness of the 
analysis. Whether it would strengthen the robustness of our results or change the results is 
impossible to conclude.   
In the analysis of time periods, the periods differ in years. In addition, we do not observe all 
the same countries, as i.e., Germany, Latvia, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia are not present 
in any of the 80’s data. This might be a problem in regard to comparing the four periods as the 
number of observations is not the same in each period. This is also a problem generated from 
there being NAs in the data. Although this is not necessarily critical, one can argue that it 
weakens the robustness of the results.  
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5. Discussion  
In this chapter we discuss the results of the analysis. First, we discuss how our results compare 
to similar research on the empirical relationship between innovation and corporate taxation. 
Next, we discuss some limitations of our study. Last, we point to topics for future research. 
In the analysis in chapter 4, we find an overall negative effect of corporate taxation on the 
number of patent applications between 1981 to 2017. However, the β-coefficient is not 
statistically significant on any level. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis based on 
the main regression.  
When analysing the panel in four time periods, we see a similar negative effect in the first 
three periods. The negative effect is not significant in the 1980’s or the 1990’s, but becomes 
significant at the 10 %-level in the 2000’s. This implies that we cannot fully trust the estimates 
from 1981 to 1999, but we can with reasonable certainty say that we find evidence of the effect 
being negative from 2000 to 2009. Additionally, we also find a significant coefficient at a 10 
%-level from 2010 to 2017, but here the effect is positive. The two significant β-coefficients 
demonstrates that there appears to be an empirical relationship between taxation and 
innovation. 
In the introduction we present Innovation and Taxation in 20th Century by Akcigit et al. (2018), 
which serves as the starting point for our study. In absence of comparable research in Europe, 
specifically over a longer time frame, our main regression replicates the study in this paper to 
the best of our ability. Likewise, we also introduce papers by Mukherjee et al. (2017) and 
Atanassov and Liu (2015). Furthermore, we introduce papers by Ernst and Spengel (2011) and 
Karkinsky and Riedel (2009), which similar to our study exploits European patent data. 
Interestingly, all five papers find various significantly negative effects of corporate taxation 
on innovation in U.S. and Europe.  
For example, Ernst and Spengel (2011) find that an increase in the combined CIT rate reduces 
the number of patent applications in Europe. Notably, Ernst and Spengel (2011) study a nearly 
identical sample (20 of our 26 countries) and time period (1998-2007) as our third interval 
(2000-2009). Given this, it may not be that remarkable that we also find a significant negative 
coefficient in this period.  
Furthermore, the samples of countries also differ from each study. For natural reasons, the 
samples of the research papers based on U.S. patent data are not comparable. One can also 
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argue that neither Ernst and Spengel (2011) or Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) are directly 
comparable. These two studies are limited to 18 and 20 European countries years, while we 
include 26 European countries. This may also explain why we find differences in significance 
for certain periods. 
A potential explanation to differences in results may also be the models’ purposes and 
assumptions. For example, similar research mainly measures patent application per firm in 
certain countries, while we associate the patent application directly to the country and study 
patent applications per 100,000 capita. For instance, Atanassov and Lui (2015) and Mukherjee 
et al. (2017) separate the independent variable by increase and decrease. 
Another distinction between our study and other comparable research, is the time period. 
While Ernst and Spengel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) are limited to ten and nine 
years, we study the effect of corporate taxation on innovation over 36 years. Hence, we cannot 
compare our results directly with others, but we note that we find negative coefficients in the 
years building up to Ernst and Spengel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2009). Furthermore, 
our study is the only one that includes the years from 2010 to 2017. In contrast, we find a 
positive significant effect in the fourth interval (2010-17). The coefficient is also significant 
on the 10 %-level. This is contradictory to previous research which has only found negative 
coefficients of corporate taxation. For this reason, it may be valuable to reflect on the reasons 
behind the positive coefficient.  
As we recognise from the literature, there has happened a lot in recent years with regard to the 
taxation of patents. In 2013, the OECD adopted an action plan to address base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS) (OECD, 2021c). This was partly due to an increasing number of 
countries offering patent boxes or other ways of deducting tax on patents, R&D or IP. A simple 
literature search reveals that a substantial number of countries have introduced such tax 
regimes during the last two decades, and that most are introduced from 2007. Thus, these 
effects cannot have been observed by Ernst and Spengel (2011) or Karkinsky and Riedel 
(2009).  
France and Ireland are notably the countries that have had such regimes in Europe for the 
longest periods of time. Ireland had a patent box since 1973 that was abolished in 2010 due to 
budgetary reasons (Ciaramella, 2017). However, a new patent box was reintroduced in 2016. 
France introduced its first patent box in 2000, but has since been amended in 2005, 2010 and 
in 2019 (PwC, 2019). Of the remaining European countries in our panel, 14 countries have a 
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patent box today, of which 10 were introduced in the years we observe in our panel. 
Specifically, patent boxes have been introduced in the following countries during the time 
period we analyse: Ireland (1973/2016), France (2000/2005/2010), Hungary (2003), 
Netherlands and Belgium (2007), Luxembourg and Spain (2008), Great Britain (2013), 
Portugal (2014) and Italy (2015) (Ciaramella, 2017; OECD, n.d.; Martins, 2018; PwC, 2015).  
As explained in chapter 2.2, a patent box is a tax regime that applies a lower corporate tax rate 
on the income from patent ownership (Gaessler et al., 2018). This implies that if a country has 
a patent box, the statutory corporate income tax rate is unaffected as the patent box is a tax 
subsidy on the CIT rate.  
Because these tax regimes were mainly introduced around 2010, this may explain why we find 
a significantly positive effect of combined CIT rates on patent applications from 2010 to 2017. 
The regime change may be a sign that combined CIT rates have lost explanatory power during 
the last ten to fifteen years, due to the growing use of patent boxes. The reason for this might 
be that the general tax policies are unaffected by changes in the specific tax policies.  
Related to patent boxes much discussed topic, and the reason the OECD adopted an action 
plan to address BEPS, is the fact that patent boxes increase incentives to transfer patents across 
borders. Although we assume that patent transfers are not a problem in our data, this might be 
an assumption that does not hold. This is especially a relevant discussion for the data of years 
from approximately 2007. Gaessler et al. (2018) find that there is a small but existent 
relationship between the introduction of a patent box and patent transfers across borders. The 
researchers further state that the more valuable a patent is, the more likely it is to be relocated 
to a country with low tax. This implicates that patents that generate large incomes may have 
been transferred and therefore imperfects the data we study. Ultimately, this could impact the 
inference of our analysis. 
Furthermore, there is a growing literature on the transfer of patents across borders, i.e., 
Gaessler et al (2018). The reason why this is especially important to understand in Europe is 
the fact that there are large differences in tax rates between countries. In addition to this, as 
we also observe, European countries have reduced their taxes significantly during the last 
decades and a country’s taxes are affected by its neighbouring countries’ taxes. The practice 
of tax avoidance and patent transfers is therefore a considerable factor when understanding 
how firms react to patenting and R&D following such changes in taxes that we have not 
accounted for. However, this has not been part of our study.  
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5.1 Limitations  
In this chapter, we point to some limitations of this study. Limitations are characteristics of 
design and assumptions that impact the interpretation of the results. Like we have described, 
econometric models are developed with different purposes and assumptions in mind. 
Accordingly, we cannot take into account every aspect of innovation and taxation.  
First, an essential limitation is that innovation will respond to taxation through different 
channels besides the statutory combined CIT rate in a country. In other words, corporate 
taxation is not the only way innovations are taxed. Although specific tax policies have been 
outside the scope of this study, we understand the drawback of not including specific policies. 
In the last decade, various European OECD countries have introduced special tax policies. For 
example, Great Britain introduced tax box in 2013 (Ciaramella, 2017). A patent box aims to 
stimulate innovation, and thereby patenting activity. If countries rather introduce patent boxes 
to stimulate innovation instead of reducing corporate tax rates, and this is the reason for the 
increase in number of patent applications in the last decade, this is a limitation in our study. 
This is also a potential explanation to why we find a positive relationship between patent 
applications and combined CIT rate in the fourth time period. Given that a growing number 
of countries introduce such policies, this may reduce the accuracy of similar research in the 
future.  
However, there are also reasons to why we do not control for this. First, specific tax policies 
vary considerably between countries. Second, data related to specific tax policies are difficult 
to obtain. The combination of these two issues makes it challenging to control for patent boxes 
in different European OECD countries.  
Although not the direct goal of this study, we could have applied data on tax reforms on patents 
if we had found adequate data. This is however a laborious exercise that is complicated to 
perform correctly and has not been a priority in this thesis.  
Another potential limitation is the absence of several other independent variables. Certain 
research papers choose to split the independent tax variable in two variables in order to 
separate the effect of tax increases and decreases. For example, Mukherjee et al. (2017) and 
Atanassov and Liu (2015) both separate their independent variable. Accordingly, such studies 
are able to capture these effects both ways. For instance, we may have found that tax decreases 
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are not particular stimulating for the number of patent applications per 100,000 capita, but that 
tax increases are specifically damaging. This may have helped to strengthen our results. 
A third consideration, debated by Akcigit et al. (2018), suggest that innovation may respond 
to corporate taxation with a lag. This means that changes in corporate taxation do not affect 
innovation immediately, but rather reduce future innovation. Akcigit et al. (2018) suggest that 
this lag starts one year after the tax change and may increase to three years depending on how 
long the innovation process is.  
Given that this lag also applies for European OECD countries, this is a limitation of our study. 
Despite this, there may also be forward-looking effects amongst inventors, because innovation 
demands investments which are paid off many years into the future. Accordingly, Akcigit et 
al. (2018) describe that current tax rates may be the best predictor of future tax rates. Given 
that this is also true, this will counteract the limitation of lag.  
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5.2 Future research 
This study has given an opportunity to study the combined universe of patents and corporate 
taxation. Although we have gained valuable insights, there have also surfaced unanswered 
questions which would be interesting topics for future research.  
First, we have spoken about the fact that innovation will respond to taxation through several 
channels beside the statutory combined CIT rate. For this reason, there may be interesting to 
study the impacts of specific tax policies on innovation. In particular, patent boxes are relevant. 
Like we also have described, more and more countries introduce specific tax policies, which 
may help to increase access to data for future research. An attempt to calculate the B-index is 
a potential start to this research. 
Second, the scope of this study has been limited to study the quantity of innovation. However, 
we also observe a considerable academic interest in quality of patents. Given that taxation (no 
longer) impacts the quantity of innovation, how do this correspond to the impact on the quality 
of innovation? For example, citations per patent may be a reasonable starting point. 
Third, when diving into the universe of innovation, the mobility of patents is a recurrent topic 
in many papers. Specifically, the transferring of patents across borders appears to be increasing 
in volume. This may also be connected to a study of the quality of innovation, since Bösenberg 
and Egger (2017) argue that “more valuable patents are more likely to be transferred”. An 
interesting debate is whether corporate inventors move to countries with lower taxation.   
Fourth, we build on the existing literature by adding more countries to our panel than Ernst 
and Spengel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2009). Although the scope of this study is to 
study European OECD countries, there may also be appropriate to study as larger sample of 




The purpose of this master’s thesis has been to analyse the impact of corporate taxation on 
innovation in Europe. This has been analysed through the following research question: 
How do corporate income tax rates impact the number of patent applications in Europe? 
Using a panel dataset constructed from OECD patent and taxation data and developing a fixed-
effects model, we investigate whether there is a relationship between corporate tax rates and 
patent applications in European OECD countries.  
The original inspiration for this master’s thesis was a working paper by Akcigit et al. (2018), 
studying this very relationship in the United States. One of the reasons why the research by 
Akcigit et al. (2018) stands out, is that it detects an empirical relationship over a very long 
timeframe. In absence of comparable long timeframe studies in Europe, we replicate a simpler 
yet similar study to Akcigit et al. (2018) by studying 26 European OECD countries from 1981 
to 2017.  
Our analyses have present multiple exciting findings. The regression analyses suggest that 
historically, an increase in corporate taxation have led to decreased innovation. Although our 
main regression of the entire time frame does not prove this impact significantly, we find a 
significant effect in the data from the first decade of the twenty-first century. In the two 
previous decades, 1980’s and 1990’s, we find a negative yet not significant effect. The 
negative effect is in accordance with the existing literature, which find significantly negative 
effects in similar time periods.  
However, we find evidence suggesting that from 2010 to 2017 the historical relationship 
between taxation and innovation flips. In this period, we find that an increase in corporate 
income taxes lead to increased innovation. In addition to being contradictory to findings in 
similar studies, this might seem counter-intuitive at first sight. Nonetheless, we argue that there 
might be adequate evidence to explain this as being a regime change in corporate taxation of 
patents.  
We observe that there are a growing number of countries that have introduced patent boxes in 
recent years. Such tax deductions are not accounted for in our analyses, and therefore we 
cannot conclude that this in fact is the main explanatory factor, but it provides a possible 
explanation. Further research is needed on this topic to conclude whether patent boxes in fact 
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have taken over the explanatory power that corporate tax rates have previously had on the 
development of patent applications in Europe.  
Our results contribute to the existing literature in multiple aspects. Before we began the 
process of writing this master’s thesis, the object was to contribute to the literature by studying 
the impact of corporate taxation on innovation in a larger sample of European OECD countries 
and over a longer time frame than previous research. As the study and results have progressed, 
we also argue that we contribute with new insight related to the regime change. 
To answer our research question, we argue that the trend has historically been that higher 
corporate tax rates result in less patent applications in Europe. However, during the 2010’s, 
this trend seems to have turned due to an increasing number of countries introducing patent 
boxes.  
In the introduction of this master’s thesis, we argue that the outcome of our study is relevant 
for policy makers. Though this argument is somewhat bold, we believe that policy makers, in 
particular national tax authorities, must pay attention to the possibility of a turning trend in the 
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8.1 Supplementary tests 
Figure A.1: Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation 
 




8.2 Choice of independent variable 
Like we discussed in chapter 3, we recognise that the standard central government CIT rate 
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅) may be a reasonable independent variable. Therefore, we include 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 as an 
alternative independent variable in column 2. This illustrates that the difference between using 
these two variables is minimal.  
While both β-coefficients of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 are negative, none of these are significant on 
any level. Likewise, the coefficients and standard error of each control variable remain nearly 
identical.  
When including both 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 as independent variables in column 3, we observe that 
the signs of the coefficients become contrary, where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 is negative and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 is positive. 
Likewise, we observe the similar results when using only 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 or both variables in the divided 
four time period regression. Although we observe that the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 become significant, we 
cannot fully trust this result. 
This appears to be a problem of collinearity caused by the high correlation (87.8 %) between 
these two variables. Although Wooldridge (2016) explains that correlation between variables 
is allowed, he also explains that high correlation can reduce the accuracy of the model. In our 
model, we experience switching signs between two correlated variables which is common with 
collinearity. Intuitively, two correlated variables should not work in the opposite direction. 
Thus, we cannot fully trust the p-values of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 when combining both variables. In addition 
to the concluding discussion in chapter 3, we therefore conclude that the use of the most 
holistic measure of corporate income tax rates, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅, is the best measure to use.  
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Table A.1: Linear Panel Regression Models of Tax Effects on Patent Applications using 
different independent variables 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 log(pats_pht) 
 (CCITR) (CITR) (BOTH) 
 
CCITR -0.007  -0.011 
 (0.006)  (0.011) 
    
CITR  -0.004 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.011) 
    
EPOm 0.511*** 0.525*** 0.501*** 
 (0.131) (0.137) (0.118) 
    
GDPG -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    
log(GDP) 1.061*** 1.056*** 1.079*** 
 (0.214) (0.215) (0.197) 
     
Observations 796 796 796 
R2 0.472 0.468 0.473 
Adjusted R2 0.425 0.420 0.426 
F Statistic 163.450
*** (df = 4; 
730) 
160.399*** (df = 4; 
730) 
131.091*** (df = 5; 
729) 
 
Note: All regressions estimated using OLS on the two-way FE-model. Column (1) estimates 
the independent variable CCITR’s effect on the dependent variable patents per 100 
thousand capita (pats_pht). Column (2) estimates the independent variable CITR’s effect on 
the dependent variable patents per 100 thousand capita (pats_pht). In column (3) both 
CCITR and CITR are included as independent variables estimating the effect on the 
dependent variable. All regressions are included country and year fixed effects. All 
controls’ coefficients included. Standard errors clustered at country-level reported in 
parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 
